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1.1 Judgement variables in forecasting
Inﬂation targeting has become commonplace among the world’s central banks.
One feature of inﬂation targeting is that forecasts concerning the expected
future path of the economy are often published or otherwise clearly communi-
cated, in part to guide private sector expectations concerning likely economic
developments contingent on the expected path of monetary policy. The fore-
cast represents the central bank’s best guess about the future path of the
economy, given all relevant information available at the time the forecast is
made. More generally, in all industrialized economies there is a forecasting
community which discusses and assimilates incoming data. This community
uses macroeconometric models, and the forecasts that are regularly published
and discussed by the community guide the expectations of private sector and
government decision-makers. In this way there is a widely understood con-
sensus forecast for industrialized economies which in principle corresponds
to the rational expectations of macroeconomic theories.
It is well-established that forecasting in practice nearly always means the
use of judgement in addition to best-eﬀort statistical analysis.1 In the fore-
casting community this is known as “add-factoring” the forecast. Forecasters
a r ew e l la w a r eo ft h ed e ﬁciencies of their models, and that important eco-
nomic eﬀects may not be captured well in the econometric analysis. The fore-
casters therefore naturally make post-estimation adjustments to their fore-
casts. Surely in many cases this judgemental adjustment is helpful. Svensson
(2003, 2005), in particular, formally shows how to solve for optimal monetary
policy when policymakers explicitly incorporate judgement terms that aﬀect
the forecasts of key variables, and shows that this can improve economic per-
1A forthright discussion of how prominently judgement enters into actual macroeco-
nomic forecasting is contained in Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997). As they
state, “... [econometric] models are rarely, if ever, used at the Federal Reserve without
at least the potential for intervention based on judgement. Instead, [the approach at the
Federal Reserve] involves a mix of strictly algorithmic methods (“science”) and judgement
guided by information not available to the model (“art”) (p. 2, italics in original).
1formance. An important policy channel emphasized in this analysis is the
inﬂuence of the judgementally adjusted forecasts on private-sector expecta-
tions. Jansson and Vredin (2001) and Svensson and Tetlow (2005) provide
empirical analyses of the impact of judgement on forecasting by the Bank of
Sweden and the US Board of Governors, respectively.
However, the judgemental adjustment is also almost surely mistaken in
some cases as well. When unique qualitative events occur that are thought to
somehow have an aﬀect on the economy but for which there is no reliable past
experience, any adjustment that might be made contains a certain amount of
guesswork.2 In some cases, forecast add-factor adjustments might be made
when in fact the event in question will have negligible fundamental impact on
t h ee c o n o m y .W h a ti st h ee ﬀect of the judgement in these cases, considering
that the judgementally-adjusted forecast, if believed, will aﬀect private sector
behavior and hence alter actual economic outcomes? The goal of this paper
is to explore this topic.
1.2 What we do
We investigate the extent to which judgemental adjustment may lead to the
possibility of self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations. For expositional simplicity, we focus
on the extreme case where the judgement variable is not intrinsically related
to economic fundamentals at all. Thus our results come from a situation
where the forecasting judgement being added is, fundamentally speaking, not
useful in forecasting the variables of interest. This is not the most realistic
case since much judgemental adjustment is in reality likely to be quite sound.
But for the purposes of this paper we are most interested in the inevitable
“guesswork” component of judgement which is unrelated to fundamentals,
and its impact on the economy. We stress this assumption is not essential.3
2Examples of these types of events in the U.S. include the Cuban Missile Crisis, wage
and price controls, Hurricane Katrina, the Y2K millenium bug, the savings and loan crisis,
and the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks.
3Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006) show that self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations can occur
in cases where judgement is related to unobserved fundamentals.
2We study systems with well-deﬁned rational expectations equilibria. We
replace rational expectations with adaptive learning using the methodology
of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We then investigate the equilibrium dy-
namics of the system if the econometric models of the agents are supple-
mented with judgement. We deﬁne the concept of an exuberance equilibrium
by imposing three requirements. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h ep e r c e i v e de v o l u t i o n
of the economy corresponds to the actual evolution by imposing a rational
expectations equilibrium with limited information, or more speciﬁcally the
consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) concept, as developed by Sargent
(1991), Marcet and Sargent (1995) and Hommes and Sorger (1998). Secondly,
we require individual rationality in individual agents’ choice to include the
judgement variable in their forecasting model, given that all other agents
are using the judgement variable and hence causing it to inﬂuence the ac-
tual dynamics of the macroeconomy. Finally, we require learnability (a.k.a.
expectational stability). When all three of these requirements are met, we
say that an exuberance equilibrium exists. In our exuberance equilibria, all
agents would be better oﬀ if the judgement variable were not being used, but
as it is being used, no agent wishes to discontinue its use.
In this paper we present the exuberance equilibrium concept without
extensive details in order to focus on the monetary policy application and
to draw out some possible policy implications. The reader is referred to
our companion paper, Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006) for a more
detailed treatment of the equilibrium concept.
1.3 Main ﬁndings
We apply our framework to the canonical New Keynesian model of Wood-
ford (2003) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). We show that exuberance
equilibria may exhibit considerable volatility relative to the underlying fun-
damental rational expectations equilibrium in which judgement does not play
a role. Numerically, we show that exuberance is a clear possibility even in
the case where the underlying rational expectations equilibrium is determi-
nate. Thus an interesting and novel ﬁnding is the possibility of “sunspot-like”
3equilibria, but without requiring that the underlying rational expectations
equilibrium of the model is indeterminate.4
Our ﬁndings suggest a new danger for policy makers: Choosing policy to
induce both determinacy and learnability may not be suﬃcient, because the
policy maker must also avoid the prospect of exuberance equilibria.5 We show
how policy may be designed to avoid this danger. More speciﬁcally, in the
cases we study, policymakers must be more aggressive than the requirements
for determinacy and learnability alone would indicate in order to avoid the
possibility of exuberance equilibria.
2 Economies with judgement
2.1 Overview
Our results depend on the idea that agents participating in macroeconomic
systems are learning using recursive algorithms, and that the systems un-
der learning eventually converge. In many cases, as discussed extensively in
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), this convergence would be to a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. The crucial aspect for the present paper is that once
agents have their macroeconometric forecast from their regression model, the
forecast is then judgementally adjusted.
To ﬁx ideas, consider an economy which may be described by
yt = βy
e
t+1 + ut, (1)
where yt is a vector of the economy’s state variables, β is a conformable
matrix, and ut is a vector of stochastic noise terms. For convenience we have
d r o p p e da n yc o n s t a n t si nt h i se q u a t i o n .T h et e r mye
t+1 represents the possibly
4Indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria are distinct concepts, as discussed in Benhabib
and Farmer (1999). We consider only linear models, for which the existence of station-
ary sunspot equilibria requires indeterminacy–see for example Propositions 2 and 3 of
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991).
5For discussions of determinacy and learnability as desiderata for the evaluation of
monetary policy rules, see Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a).
For a survey see Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) and Bullard (2006).
4non-rational expectation of private sector agents. The novel feature of this







tyt+1 + ξt. (2)
We stress that if the judgement vector is null, the model corresponds to a
version of systems analyzed extensively in Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
and that the conditions for convergence of learning to rational expectations
equilibrium in that case are well-established.
2.2 The nature of judgemental adjustment
We ﬁrst discuss how we model the judgemental add-factor. We view this
as an attempt to allow for the impact of occasional unique events. Let ηt
represent “news” about qualitative events judged to have signiﬁcant impact
on the economy, where ηt measures that part of the anticipated impact on
yt+1 t h a ti sb e l i e v e dn o tt ob er e ﬂected in E 
tyt+1. The forecasted future
impact of this news is given by the derivative matrix
∂yt+1+j
∂ηt
= ψt,j,f o rj =1 ,2,3,...,
Since we are here concerned with the judgemental adjustment, ψt,jηt mea-
sures the judgemental forecaster’s view about the extent to which this news
about qualitative events will fail to be reﬂected over time in the econometric
forecast.
We think of ηt as pertaining to “unique” events and it has two compo-
nents: (i) the expected eﬀect of new qualitative events and (ii) new informa-
tion about recent qualitative events that still have an impact on the economy.
Since ηt represents news we assume it to be a martingale diﬀerence sequence
(which for convenience we will take to be white noise). It might often take
the value zero.
The future impact ψt,j of ηt could in general have a complex time proﬁle
that reﬂects speciﬁc features of the unique qualitative events. For analytical
5simplicity only we make the assumption
ψt,j = ρ
j









jηt−j =( I − ρL)
−1ηt,
where L is the lag operator, and the total judgemental adjustment in ye
t+1
satisﬁes
(I − ρL)ξt = ηt (3)
or equivalently ξt = ρξt−1+ηt. Thus the expected eﬀects of the judgemental
variables on yt+1 c a nb es u m m a r i z e da sρξt−1, the expected impact of past
news, plus ηt, the impact of current news.
While the VAR(1) form of ξt is convenient for our analysis, the judgemen-
tal forecasters would resist any attempt by the econometricians to reduce it
to a measurable variable since they would not think it appropriate to treat
past qualitative events as similar to current qualitative events, that is, they
w o u l dr e g a r di ta sam i s t a k et ot r e a tt h ej u d g e m e n tv a r i a b l ea sau s e f u l
econometric time series. The view that the judgement variable ξt captures
unique features added to forecasts is consistent with Svensson (2005), who
also treats the judgemental term as appropriately included as an adjustment
to forecasts rather than as a variable to be incorporated into the economet-
ric model. Our analysis diﬀers from Svensson (2005) in that we focus on the
implications of erroneous judgement. Speciﬁcally, we assume that ut and ηt
evolve independently, so that the judgement variable in fact has no funda-
mental eﬀect on the economy described by equation (1). This is obviously
an important and extreme assumption but it is also the one that we think is
the most interesting for the purpose of illustrating our main points, as it is
the starkest case.6
6In Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006) we show that no substantive changes to
our results are introduced when ηt and ut are correlated.
62.3 Econometric forecasts
We now turn to the nature of the macroeconometric forecast. The hallmark
of the recursive learning literature is the assignment of a perceived law of mo-
tion to the agents, so that we can view them as using recursive algorithms
to update their forecasts of the future based on actual data produced by the
system in which they operate.7 A key aspect of this assignment is to keep the
perceived law of motion (at least approximately) consistent with the actual
law of motion of the system, which will be generated by the interaction of
equation (1) with the agents’ expectations formation process.8 The econo-
metric forecast will be generated by a time-series model for the endogenous
variables yt.
Suppose the econometric time-series model, in moving average form, is
yt = θ(L)vt, (4)








is the minimum mean square error forecast based on this perceived law of
motion. We call (5) the econometric forecast. It is based on the econometric
model, the perceived law of motion, alone, and is the traditional description
of the expectations formation process both under rational expectations and
in the learning literature.
2.4 Exuberance equilibrium
2.4.1 Overview
Since expectations in the economy are being formed via equation (2), and
since these expectations aﬀect the evolution of the economy’s state through
7Our analysis diﬀers from but is related to the literature in ﬁnance on strategic profes-
sional forecasting, see e.g. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2004) and the references therein.
8In line with this literature, the econometric forecasts are based on reduced form mod-
els. It would also be of interest to examine the questions we study in the context of
econometric forecasts based on structural models.
7equation (1), we deduce an actual law of motion for this system. Combining











judgement naturally inﬂuences the evolution of the state because it inﬂuences
the views of economic actors concerning the future. The critical question is
then whether there are conditions under which the agents would continue to
use the add-factored forecast (2) when the economy is evolving according to
equation (6). That is, could the agents come to perceive that the judgement
variable is in fact useful in forecasting the state variable, even though by
construction there is no fundamental relationship? Our main purpose in this
paper is to answer this question.
In order to guide our thinking, we deﬁne the concept of an exuberance
equilibrium and seek to understand the conditions under which such an equi-
librium would exist. An exuberance equilibrium is one in which the evolution
of the judgement variable inﬂuences actual economic outcomes, even though
there may be no fundamental impact of the judgement factor. Our concept
has three key components, all of which are discussed in detail in the subsec-
tions below. The ﬁrst is that the econometric forecast should be consistent
with the data generated by the model. In some sense, the econometric model
should not be falsiﬁa b l e .T oi m p o s et h i sc o n d i t i o n ,w eu s et h eC E Ec o n c e p t .
The second component is that each individual agent in the economy should
conclude that it is in their interests to judgementally adjust their forecast,
given that all other agents are making a similar judgemental adjustment.
The third component is that the stationary outcome is stable in the learning
process being used by the agents. Thus, given the model with judgement
(1), (3), (5), and (2), an exuberance equilibrium exists if (i) a CEE exists,
(ii) individual agents rationally decide to include the (non-trivial) judge-
ment variable in their forecasts given that all other agents are judgementally
adjusting their forecasts, and (iii)t h eC E Ei sl e a r n a b l e .
Are there conditions under which an exuberance equilibrium could exist?
There are, and we argue that the conditions are in fact worrisomely plausible.
8In order to obtain some intuition, we turn to an analysis of each of the above
conditions.
2.4.2 Consistent expectations
The core idea of a CEE is that the econometric forecasters should see no
diﬀerence between their perceived law of motion for how the economy evolves
and the actual data from the economy. One way to develop conditions under
which such an outcome may occur is to require that the autocovariances of
the perceived law of motion correspond exactly to the autocovariances of the
actual law of motion.9
It is possible to obtain an analytic expression for the CEE in the univariate
case.10 T h ep r o c e d u r ef o rt h eu n i v a r i a t ec a s ei sd i ﬃcult to generalize to a
multivariate setting. However, it is straightforward to show how to obtain
approximate CEE based on agents using a VAR(p)P L M .E s t i m a t i o no fV A R s
is in practice the standard forecasting tool in multivariate settings. We will
show that while a VAR(p) process cannot deliver an exact CEE, for large
values of p it will deliver close approximations.




biyt−i + vt, (7)
where yt, vt are n × 1 vectors, the bi are n × n matrices and Ey0
t−ivt =0











The ALM is thus





βbi+1yt−i + βξt + ut
)
. (8)
9See Hommes and Sorger (1998), Hommes, Sorger, and Wagener (2004) and Branch
and McGough (2005). A closely related idea is developed in Marcet and Sargent (1995).
10See Bullard, Evans and Honkapohja (2006).
9It is easily veriﬁed that the ALM is a VARMA(p, 1 )p r o c e s sa n dt h i si st h e
sense in which the VAR(p)P L Mc a no n l yg i v ea na p p r o x i m a t eC E E .
Let b =( b1,...,b p) and let P[yt |Yt−1]=T(b)0Yt−1 be the linear projection
of yt on Yt−1 where Y 0
t−1 =( y0
t−1,...,y0












An approximate CEE is deﬁned as a value ¯ b that satisﬁes the equation ¯ b =
T(¯ b). We require also that all roots of det(I −
Pp
i=1 biLi)=0lie outside the
u n i tc i r c l es ot h a tyt is a stationary process. In an approximate CEE, for each
variable the forecast errors vt of the econometric forecasters have the property
that they are orthogonal to Y 0
t−1. It follows that the agents are “getting
right” all of the ﬁrst p autocovariances of the yt process. For a stationary
process the autocovariances Eytyt−j → 0 as j →∞and thus stationary
ﬁxed points ¯ b deliver approximate CEE in the sense that as p becomes large
the econometric forecasters neglect only high order autocovariances that are
vanishingly small.
2.4.3 Learnability
Since we have made an assumption that the econometricians in the model
are learning using recursive algorithms, we also need to impose learnability
of any proposed equilibrium as a condition for plausibility. We study the sta-
bility of the system under learning following the literature on least squares
learning in which the economic agents making forecasts are assumed to em-
ploy econometric models with parameters updated over time as new data
becomes available.11 The standard way to analyze systems under learning
is to employ results on recursive algorithms such as recursive least squares.
In many applications it can be shown that there is convergence to ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium, provided the equilibrium satisﬁes a stability
condition.
11See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for analysis of adaptive learning in macroeconomics
and references to the literature.
10For the case at hand we verify the learnability condition numerically as a
by-product of our computation of the approximate CEE, as we now describe.
To compute T(b) we write the system in ﬁrst order form





with zt =( Y
0







be obtained from the equation










Here Var (zt) i st h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo fzt, vec(K) is the vectorization of a
matrix K and ⊗ is the Kronecker product. The equilibrium ¯ b c a nt h e nb e
calculated by the E-stability algorithm
bs = bs−1 + γ(T(bs−1) − bs−1), (10)
where γ is chosen to be a small positive constant.
This procedure will automatically give us learnable equilibria in the fol-
lowing sense. The econometricians are estimating a VAR(p)P L Mf o ryt and
are assumed to update their parameter estimates over time using recursive
least squares (RLS). As previously explained, the decision makers add their
judgemental adjustment to the econometricians’ forecast and, together with
the variable ut, the current value of yt is determined. The vector T(b) denotes
t h et r u ec o e ﬃcients projection for given forecast coeﬃcients b.U n d e r R L S
learning it can be shown that the estimates bt at time t on average move in
the direction T(bt). Equation (10) describes this adjustment in notional time
s. Using the techniques of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it can be shown
that RLS learning converges locally to ¯ b if it is a locally asymptotically stable
ﬁxed point of (10), for suﬃciently small γ>0. Formal details of the RLS
algorithm and learning are outlined in Appendix A.
2.4.4 Incentives to include judgement
Finally, we also require the condition concerning the incentives to include
judgement. When all agents in the model are making use of the judgemen-
11tally adjusted forecast described in equation (2), they induce an actual law
of motion for the system, which is described by equation (6). An individ-
ual agent may nevertheless decide that it is possible to make more eﬃcient
forecasts by simply ignoring the judgemental adjustment. If this is possible,
then it is not individually rational for all agents to use the add-factored fore-
cast. We check this individual forecast eﬃciency condition by comparing the
variance of the forecast error for the judgemental forecast (2) to the variance
of the forecast error with judgement not included, the econometric forecast
(5), under the condition that all other agents are using the judgementally
adjusted forecast and thus are inducing the actual law of motion (6).
In other words, we need conditions that the covariance matrix of ye
t+1 −
yt+1 is in some sense smaller than the covariance matrix of E 
tyt+1 − yt+1.12
Denote the covariance matrix without judgement as M(0) a n dw i t hj u d g e -
ment as M(1). We will usually interpret the incentive to include judgement
condition to mean that the element by element comparison of the matrices
along the diagonal are all smaller for M(1).T h a ti s ,w er e q u i r et h a t
M(0)i − M(1)i > 0
for all diagonal elements i. By setting up the model in ﬁrst-order state space
form, and including in the state the forecast errors with and without judge-
ment, it is straightforward to compute M(0) − M(1) and test numerically
for the existence of exuberance equilibria.
When an approximate CEE is stable under learning and satisﬁes the in-
centives condition to include judgement, then we refer to it as an approximate
exuberance equilibrium.
We sometimes refer to alternative versions of the incentive condition as a
method of categorizing our results. If the individual rationality condition is
m e ti nt h es e n s et h a tt h ed i ﬀerence between the two covariance matrices is a
positive deﬁnite matrix, in conjunction with the other two requirements, we
say that a strong exuberance equilibrium exists. If some diagonal elements
12Since ye
t+1 and E 
t yt+1 h a v et h es a m em e a na syt+1 the variance of the forecast error
is the same as the mean squared error.
12of the diﬀerence between the two covariance matrices are positive, while
others are negative, when all other conditions are met, this means that the
agents may or may not come to the conclusion that including the judgemental
adjustment is valuable. We will refer to this case as indeﬁnite. Another
possibility is that the diagonal elements of the diﬀerence between the two
covariance matrices are all negative when all other conditions are met. In this
case the agents would most likely conclude that the inclusion of judgement
was not valuable. We call this case one of non-exuberance.F i n a l l y , t o b e
complete, the diﬀerence could be a negative deﬁnite matrix in which case we
say that there is strong non-exuberance.
2.4.5 Remark on model averaging
In our exuberance equilibrium concept, we allow atomistic agents to contem-
plate deviations from the judgementally adjusted forecast. These deviations
involve ignoring the judgemental component of the forecast entirely. One
might wish to consider the possibility of merely “downweighting” the judge-
mental forecast to create a new forecast which is a weighted average of the
pure econometric forecast and the judgementally adjusted forecast. In some
circumstances, this downweighting may produce a lower MSE forecast than
the judgementally adjusted forecast. If all agents pursued this option, the
best-response aspect of the exuberance equilibrium described in Section 2.4.4
would break down. This is the main reason why we call our exuberance equi-
libria “near-rational.” However, although our equilibrium is in this sense not
fully rational, we think that in practice it is very plausible.
As discussed earlier in the paper, we think of our model as being a stark
case, one in which the judgement we analyze is all noise. But we also ac-
knowledge that much real-world judgemental adjustment is likely to be quite
sound. We want to think of the agents in our model as operating in an econ-
omy where most judgemental adjustment is in fact sound. For these cases,
downweighting a judgement that is being used economywide will lead to worse
forecasts in a MSE sense. This provides one rationale for why the agents in
13the model do not consider downweighting the judgemental forecast.13
W ea l s ot h i n kt h a ti tw o u l db ed i ﬃcult to describe a plausible real-time
process that could discover the value of downweighting in an actual economy.
The contemplated concept is that when an event such as 9/11 occurs and
judgemental adjustments are made to the forecast, agents in the economy
downweight the judgemental forecast somewhat on the basis that this will
produce better long-run forecasting performance. For this to be veriﬁed in
the data, the agents need the track record of the judgemental forecaster over
a period of many quarters. The judgements would have been made over a
variety of unique events, ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to Hurricane
Katrina. We do not think most participants in the economy would be willing
to average across forecast performance for such disparate events. Even if they
were willing to do so, it is possible to show that it can take very large samples
of data to detect any deviation from full rationality of the judgementally
adjusted forecast.14
Finally, possible downweighting would still leave the judgement inﬂuential
for the state variables of the system. The excess volatility associated with
the exuberance equilibrium driven solely by noisy judgement would decline
over time through a learning process if we allowed downweighting. But if we
allow for some of the judgement to be sound, then the value of relying on
judgemental forecasting would then reassert itself and agents would again be
susceptible to poor judgements that inﬂuence actual outcomes.
3 Exuberance and monetary policy
3.1 A New Keynesian model
We now study examples of exuberance equilibria in a New Keynesian macro-
economic model suggested by Woodford (2003) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
13We note that Svensson (2005) and Svensson and Tetlow (2005) do not allow for model
averaging when they model the inclusion of judgement..
14See Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006).










πt = κxt + δπ
e
t+1 +˜ uπ,t, (12)
rt = ϕππt + ϕxxt. (13)
In these equations, xt is the output gap, πt is the deviation of inﬂation from
target, and rt is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from the value that
is consistent with inﬂation at target and output at potential. All variables
are expressed in percentage point terms and the steady state is normalized
to zero. The terms ˜ ux,t and ˜ uπ,t represent stochastic disturbances to the
economy. The parameter σ−1 is related to the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption of a representative household. The parameter κ
is related to the degree of price stickiness in the economy, and δ is the discount
factor of a representative household.15 The third equation describes the
T a y l o r - t y pepo l i c yr u l ei nu s eb yt h epo l i c ya u t h o r i t y ,i nw h i c ht h ep a r a m e t e r s
ϕπ and ϕx a r ea s s u m e dt ob ep o s i t i v e . I nt h e formulation (11)-(13), only
private sector expectations aﬀect the economy.
Substituting (13) into (11) and writing the system in matrix form gives
(1) where yt =[ xt,πt]
0, ut = C˜ ut, ˜ ut =[ ˜ ux,t, ˜ uπ,t]
0 with covariance matrix Σu,
β =
1
σ + ϕx + κϕπ
∙
σ 1 − δϕπ






σ + ϕx + κϕπ
∙
σ −ϕπ




3.2.1 A Taylor-type monetary policy rule
We now illustrate the possibility of approximate exuberance equilibria in the
New Keynesian model. We use Woodford’s (2003) calibration σ =0 .157,
15This formulation of the model is based upon individual Euler equations under (iden-
tical) private sector expectations. Other models of bounded rationality are possible, see,
for instance, Preston (2005) for a formulation in which long-horizon expectations directly
aﬀect individual behavior.
15κ =0 .024,a n dδ =0 .99.F o rt h ee x u b e r a n c ev a r i a b l ew ea s s u m et h em a t r i x
describing the degree of serial correlation is ρ =d i a g ( 0 .99,0.95) and Ση =
diag(0.0035,0.0035).16 The variances of the fundamental shocks are assumed
to be Σ˜ u =d i a g ( 1 .1,0.03). We have not calibrated these shocks except
to choose values that, in the exuberance equilibrium, roughly match U.S.
inﬂation and output-gap variances measured in percent.
The policy parameters ϕπ and ϕx can be varied and we are interested in
values of ϕπ and ϕx that might be consistent with exuberance equilibrium.
Consider ϕπ =1 .05 and ϕx =0 .05. These values satisfy the Taylor principle
and deliver a determinate and learnable rational expectations equilibrium in
Bullard and Mitra (2002). Suppose that econometricians estimate a VAR(3).
We calculated the approximate CEE and found that the output variance is
approximately 2.54 and the inﬂation variance is approximately 6.14.T h e
matrix describing the condition for individual rationality, M(0) − M(1),
is positive deﬁnite, hence the CEE is strongly exuberant. The exuberance
equilibrium exhibits excess volatility. In fact, the ratio of the output-gap
standard deviation in the exuberance equilibrium to its standard deviation
in the fundamental rational expectations equilibrium is about 1.5 and for the
standard deviation of inﬂation the corresponding ratio is almost 16!
A change in the Taylor-rule coeﬃcients can diminish the likelihood of
exuberance equilibria. When ϕπ is increased to 1.1 the equilibrium is no
longer strongly exuberant but it does remain exuberant. However, if ϕπ is
increased to 1.5 and ϕx is increased to 0.1, the possibility of an exuberance
equilibrium is eliminated. In this sense, a more aggressive policy tends to
reduce the likelihood of an exuberance equilibrium.
We next analyze the idea that more aggressive policy is less likely to be
associated with the existence of exuberance equilibrium more systematically.
For this, we calculate the conditions for exuberance equilibrium using the
calibration given above but allowing the Taylor rule coeﬃcients to vary. The
r e s u l t sa r eg i v e ni nF i g u r e1 ,w h e r eϕπ ∈ (0,1.25) and ϕx ∈ (0,0.25) at
selected grid points. The open squares indicate the points where determinacy
16Somewhat lower values of the ρ parameters delivered qualitatively similar results.
16and learnability of the rational expectations equilibrium hold for this model.17
The Figure displays the points at which exuberance equilibria exist. These
points tend to be for values of ϕx less than about 0.08, and for values of ϕπ
up to 1.25. Again, these exuberance equilibria exist in the region associated
with determinacy, and therefore can arise in parameter regions where sunspot
equilibria are ruled out.
3.2.2 A forward-looking monetary policy rule







in which policymakers react to forecasts of future values of the inﬂation
deviation and the output gap. Interest-rate rules depending on expectations
of future inﬂation and the output gap have been discussed extensively in the
monetary policy literature and are subject to various interpretations. Here we
are assuming that the monetary authorities form forecasts in the same way as
the private sector, that is, by constructing an econometric forecast to which
they consider adding the same judgement variable. We might hope that by
reacting aggressively enough to expectations such a rule would diminish the
likelihood of exuberance equilibria. With the policy rule (14) the reduced
form system is the same except that the coeﬃcient matrices become
β =
∙
1 − σ−1ϕx σ−1 (1 − ϕπ)
κ(1 − σ−1ϕx) δ + κσ−1 (1 − ϕπ)
¸






Using the same calibration, we calculate whether the conditions for exu-
berance equilibria hold for ϕπ ∈ (0,3.5) and ϕx ∈ (0,0.35) at selected grid
points. The results are plotted in Figure 2.18 The open squares again indicate
the points where determinacy and learnability of the rational expectations
17T h eb l a n ka r e at ot h el e f ti nt h i sﬁgure is associated with indeterminacy of rational
expectations equilibrium.
18There is a subtlety in this example due to the fact that the central bank has non-
negligible macroeconomic eﬀects. We assume that in comparing the performance of fore-
casts with and without judgement they compare forecasts to actual, realized, data.
17equilibrium hold for this model.19 As with the standard Taylor-type rule, the
Figure indicates that exuberance equilibria exist near the point (1,0).M o r e
aggressive policy delivers non-exuberance. In particular, very small values
of ϕx are suﬃcient to yield non-exuberance if ϕπ is greater than (approx-
imately) 1.8. We conclude that by following an explicit policy of reacting
against the deviations of expectations from the values justiﬁed by the funda-
mental shocks, monetary authorities enhance the stability of the economy.
3.2.3 Optimal monetary policy rules
Finally, we discuss optimal discretionary policy as in Evans and Honkapohja
(2003). They assign a standard quadratic objective to the policymaker with
weight α on output gap variance. They write the resulting optimal policy
as a Taylor-type rule in the expected output gap and the expected inﬂa-
tion deviation, along with reactions to fundamental shocks in the economy.
Their policy rule delivers determinacy, and the unique stationary rational
expectations equilibrium is stable under least squares learning for all values












u,x˜ ux,t + ϕ
 
u,π˜ uπ,t. (15)
where the optimal values ϕ 
x = ϕ 
u,x = σ, and the matrices β and C become
β =
∙
0 σ−1 (1 − ϕ 
π)
0 δ + κσ−1 (1 − ϕ 
π)
¸








We have ϕ 
u,π = δ
−1 (ϕ 
π − 1), where ϕ 
π depends on α. A small policy weight
on output gap variability α → 0 (an inﬂation hawk), is associated with
an optimal value ϕ 
π =1+σδκ−1 ≈ 7.47. A large weight on output gap
variability, α →∞ , (an inﬂation dove), is associated with an optimal value
ϕ 
π → 1. Thus we can calculate whether exuberance equilibria exist for all
19For the forward-looking rule, indeterminacy of the fundamental rational expectations
equilibrium occurs not only in the blank area to the left in the ﬁgure, but also in the blank
area toward the top of the ﬁgure.
18possible values of the policymaker weight α by choosing values for ϕ 
π ∈
(1,7.47).
The results of this calculation20 indicate that for values of ϕ 
π ∈ (1, ¯ ϕπ)
the equilibrium is in the indeﬁnite region. For values ϕ 
π ∈ (¯ ϕπ,7.47), the
equilibrium is non-exuberant. The cutoﬀ value is ¯ ϕπ ≈ 1.557. Thus standard
optimal policy calculations alone are not enough to ensure non-exuberance.
To move into the non-exuberance region, policymakers must have a suﬃ-
ciently small weight on output gap variability. The policy weight value asso-
ciated with ϕ 
π =1 .557 is quite low, approximately α ≈ 0.00612. More weight
than this on output gap variance implies a value for ϕ 
π that is too low, in
the sense that it places the equilibrium in the indeﬁnite region.21
4 Conclusions and possible extensions
We have shown how the use of judgement or “add-factors” may cause a type
of self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuation–which we call exuberance equilibria–to occur in
a standard New Keynesian model of monetary policy. The excess volatility
we isolate occurs in a subset of the determinacy region of the economy, a
portion of the parameter space that has typically been viewed as desirable
in the literature. We have also shown how more aggressive monetary policy
rules, ones which specify stronger reactions to economic events, can mitigate
or eliminate the possibility of exuberance equilibria.
Since macroeconometric models are at best crude approximations to eco-
nomic reality, there is a clear rationale for judgemental adjustment. And,
indeed, most judgement is likely to be sound. Yet, judgemental adjustments
are unlikely to be perfect and may at times be far oﬀ the fundamental real-
ities of the macroeconomy. We have highlighted the diﬃculties which may
20The exact optimal policy rule would create perfect multicollinearity in this system.
To avoid this complication, we set ϕx =1 .01σ, slightly higher than the optimal value.
21If we assume that the policymaker has the same preferences as the representative
household, we obtain a value of α ≈ .00313 at the calibrated values of Woodford (2003).
(This is calculated as κ/θ =0 .024/7.67,w h e r eθ is the parameter controlling the price
elasticity of demand.) The value of ϕ 




suggest an optimal value of ϕ 
π ≈ 2.0, large enough to imply non-exuberance.
19arise when judgement of this latter type enters an economy with strong ex-
pectational feedback.
In this paper, we have focussed on a situation in which there is substan-
tial agreement in the economy about the relevant judgemental adjustments.
This is a restrictive assumption, and diﬀerences of opinion certainly exist
in actual economies about what sorts of judgemental adjustments should be
made. Allowing for diﬀerences in judgements would probably make the con-
ditions for exuberance equilibrium more diﬃcult to achieve. On the other
hand, this could create new phenomena, such as momentum eﬀects, arising
when a large fraction of agents begins to agree in their judgements. Another
interesting case may occur when diﬀerences of opinion pit the central bank
against ﬁnancial markets, raising questions about the nature of equilibrium
and the optimal reaction of the monetary authority. We think it would be
interesting to address these issues in future research.
A Appendix: Recursive learning





using recursive least squares. Let bt =( b1,t,...,bp,t) denote the parameter esti-
mates at time t and let Y 0
t−1 =( y0
t−1,...,y0
t−p) be the vector of state variables.








t Yt−1(yt − bt−1Yt−1)
0




Here Rt is an estimate of the matrix of second moments of Yt−1 and the ﬁrst
equation is just the recursive form of the multivariate least squares formula.
N o t et h a ta s s u m p t i o n sa b o u tt i m i n ga r ea sf o l l o w s .A tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt−1
econometricians update their parameter estimates to bt−1 u s i n gd a t au pt o
t−1.A tt i m et econometricians use these parameter estimates and observed
20Yt to make their forecast E 
tyt+1.22 At the end of time t econometricians
update the parameters to bt. For further discussion of RLS learning see
Chapters 2, 8 and 10 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
The question of interest is whether limt→∞ bt → ¯ b,w h e r e¯ b =( ¯ b1,...,¯ bp)
denotes the approximate CEE . In this case ¯ b is said to be locally learnable.
It can be shown that the asymptotic dynamics of (bt,R t) are governed by
an associated diﬀerential diﬀerential equation and that, in particular, the






−1 − b = T(b) − b.
Here τ denotes notional or virtual time, yt(b) is the stationary stochastic
process given by (8) for ﬁxed b and Yt−1(b)0 =( yt−1(b)0,...,y t−p(b)0).N u m e r i -
cally, convergence can be veriﬁed using the E-stability algorithm (10), which
c a na l s ob eu s e dt oc o m p u t et h ea p p r o x i m a t eC E E .
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Determinacy and E-stability Exuberance Strong Exuberance
Figure 1: Exuberance equilibria in the New Keynesian model. Open boxes
indicate points where the REE is determinate. Triangles indicate points
where exuberance equilibria exist.
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Strong non-exuberance
Figure 2: Suﬃciently aggressive policy is again associated with non-
exuberance when the policy rule is forward-looking.
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